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11. Introduction
Reference dependence is an important factor in decision making. Its role is
empirically well established for individual choice situations and it has successfully
been modeled through prospect theory (Kahneman, 2003). Less is known about the
effects of reference dependence in real-world markets. A central problem in all
applications of reference dependence concerns the choice of the reference point
(Bleichrodt, 2007; Lin, Huang, & Zeelenberg, 2006; Sayman & Öncüler, 2005;
Schmidt, 2003), and market situations usually offer a number of possible candidate
points. List prices, other persons’ valuations, or prices of alternative products may
serve as reference points for the agent’s valuation of a product. In particular, reference
point effects will be relevant if agents are uncertain about their own willingness-to-
pay and therefore construct valuations in an environment with external cues
(Kristensen & Gärling, 1997; Rosenkranz & Schmitz, 2007; Stern & Stafford, 2006).
Markets where reference points would be expected to exert a strong influence
on decisions are the rapidly growing online auction platforms like eBay or uBid. On
these auction websites consumers and businesses sell to consumers directly,
substituting for traditional intermediaries. Buyers face a complex environment with
competition, changing prices, minimum bids, buy-it-now options and time pressure.
In this environment it is conceivable that cues provided within the auction process
influence the buyers’ valuation and bidding behavior.
A recent theoretical analysis by Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) considers the
seller’s public reserve price (minimum bid) as a possible reference point that
influences buyers’ willingness-to-pay in auctions. In their model, a higher price not
only reduces the buyers’ surplus, it also triggers an additional disutility, which is
increasing in the disparity between the price paid and the seller’s reserve price. The
buyers’ valuations therefore depend on the publicly announced reserve price, and a
higher reserve price will ceteris paribus raise the consumers’ willingness-to-pay
because it reduces this disparity.
The empirical evidence for this reference point effect, which is discussed in
Section 2 of the paper, is inconclusive. Ariely and Simonson (2003), Kamins, Drèze,
and Folkes (2004), and Stern and Stafford (2006) show positive effects of reserve
prices on selling prices in field data and in field experiments. Bajari and Hortacsu
(2003) find no evidence for reference dependence in their field study. Hoppe and
2Sadrieh (2007) conduct a field experiment and find no evidence either. Our paper
adds to the literature by introducing an empirical model that distinguishes between
psychological and economic reserve price effects, and by testing for these separate
effects in an environment that eliminates the potentially confounding effects from
signaling quality and trustworthiness.
When studying consumer behavior with real products on eBay and similar
platforms, signaling through reserve prices cannot easily be controlled. Buyers cannot
verify the quality of the product ex-ante, introducing uncertainty and asymmetric
information between buyers and sellers. Apart from private values for the product
based on some fixed quality1 , a common value component and a winner’s curse
problem become relevant. The winner’s curse refers to the fact that the bidder with
the highest estimate of quality is likely to hold a too positive view of the true but
unobservable quality (common value), which then forms the basis of private
valuations of the product. In such an environment reserve prices can serve as quality
signals and therefore influence bids even in the absence of reference dependence. The
importance of trust and reputation in online auctions further aggravates the scope for
signaling (Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson, & Lockwood, 2006).
We overcome all problems associated with quality uncertainty by studying
reserve and selling prices for virtual football players traded in English auctions on
hattrick.org. Hattrick is the world’s largest online football manager game with almost
one million participants. Every day several ten thousand players are traded on the
Hattrick transfer market. Sellers can choose a non-negative reserve price (public
minimum bid). When Hattrick players are on the market, all relevant information
concerning their quality becomes publicly available. That is, there is no information
asymmetry between buyers and sellers. Reserve prices cannot contain any quality
signal and there is neither scope for winner’s curse or for concerns regarding the
sellers’ trustworthiness. In Section 3 we discuss the auction market in Hattrick in
detail. There we also explain how the success in this open-ended manager game
crucially depends on successful trading of the participants.2
1 Note that an agent can be uncertain about her private valuation of the product even if the quality is
observed and fixed.
2 Two other papers study the Hattrick environment. Englmaier and Schmöller (2008) examine optimal
search behavior in the Hattrick market, and Ajalin, Granö, and Nyberg (2004) consider Hattrick
football matches in their study on betting on virtual sports events.
3In our empirical model we distinguish between the behavioral reference point
effect discussed above, and a mechanical effect as predicted by auction theory (Riley-
Samuelson, 1981). In second price auctions like those on eBay and Hattrick, the price
paid by the highest bidder corresponds to the second highest bid (increased by one
bidding increment). If the reserve price falls between the highest and the second
highest bidder’s valuation, however, there is only one bidder. The price is then given
by the reserve price. In this case, the selling price “mechanically” increases with a
higher reserve price. Note that this effect is entirely driven by the auction design and
occurs irrespectively of any reference-dependent utility effect.
We use data on 364 football players that were posted on the transfer market to
study the effect of publicly announced reserve prices, and we identify both the
reference point and the mechanical effect of the reserve prices. Our approach also
accounts for two technical problems that have received little attention in empirical
studies of reserve prices: first, we control for censoring, i.e. the fact that high reserve
prices might result in items not being traded. Second, we consider the potential
endogeneity of the reserve price. In this vein, we examine whether neglecting
censoring and endogeneity problems can lead to a biased assessment of the reserve
price effects.
A detailed discussion of our empirical strategy and the data is provided in
Section 4. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the results,
relates them to the literature, and considers potential problems of our approach. The
concluding section shows how the results from virtual football can inform us about
the interaction of behavioral and market effects in the pricing of football players in
real world markets. In particular, we discuss which properties of the market for
football players are—according to our results—likely to promote or mitigate reserve
price effects, respectively. The section also considers avenues for future research in
more controlled laboratory settings.
2. Reserve prices as reference points: Review of the empirical literature
The effect of reserve prices in auctions has been studied in field experiments,
where the researcher sells items at different reserve prices on eBay, and in field
studies using data from real auctions. One of the first studies was conducted by Ariely
and Simonson (2003) who use both formats. In their field study Ariely and Simonson
4analyze the impact of reserve prices on the final price for college football tickets.
They find that each dollar increase in the reserve price increases the sales price by 80
cents. The authors do not control for tickets for which there was only one bidder. Part
of the observed reserve price effect might therefore be due to the mechanical effect
caused by competitive reserve price setting. Ariely and Simonson do not discuss
censoring or endogeneity problems.
In their field experiment Ariely and Simonson sell various items at either low
or high reserve prices on eBay. In some auctions the same item was offered at both
the high and the low reserve price simultaneously. They find a positive effect of the
high reserve price on average bids, but only if there was no low reserve price item
offered simultaneously. Although there were no unsold items, indicating modest
reserve prices, some items might have been sold exactly at the reserve price. Hence,
the effect could at least partially be driven by the mechanical effect of the second
price auction rather than by reference dependence.
Kamins et al. (2004) sell sets of unsearched coins 3 at either low or high
reserve prices on eBay and find a positive effect on selling prices. There were bids
exactly at the reserve price. Additionally, the items sold here carry considerable
quality uncertainty, and the reserve price may convey a signal about whether the sets
are indeed unsearched. For instance, bidders could perceive a high reserve price as a
signal that the seller expects some valuable coins to still be in the set.
Stern and Stafford (2006) study field data from eBay auctions for a wide range
of product categories. Not accounting for censoring, they consider only auctions that
resulted in a sale and find a strong positive effect of sellers’ reserve prices on transfer
prices (65 cents increase in transfer price for each dollar increase in the reserve price).
There are two studies which find no effect of the reserve prices. The first is
Hoppe and Sadrieh (2007), who study the link between reserve and selling prices for
DVDs and coins on eBay. Their negative result is somewhat surprising, because there
were many observations for items that sold at exactly the reserve price. For these
observations, the mechanical effect should establish a positive effect of reserve on
selling prices.
Bajari and Hartacsu (2003) study the uncertainty about product value and
winner’s curse in a sample of auctions for coins on eBay. They also assess the effect
3 “Unsearched” means that the seller has not searched and removed valuable coins from the set. The
true value of the set should therefore be unknown to both sellers and buyers.
5of reserve on selling prices and find a positive effect in a simple OLS regression. The
effect vanishes, however, once they control for censoring, i.e. high reserve prices
preventing items from being traded.
The results of these studies are inconclusive regarding the psychological effect
of reserve prices. The reference point and the mechanical effects have not been
distinguished so far, and censoring and endogeneity may have affected the estimated
effects (see Section 4). Reference dependence might have subtle effects that can not
be identified in all samples, which could explain the negative evidence in the latter
two studies. Similarly, the mechanical effect depends on the presence of competitive
reserve prices and significant valuation differences between bidders. If the valuation
difference between the highest and second highest bidder is small, there is little to
gain from a competitive reserve price and the effect on selling prices will be
negligible.
Asymmetric information about quality and trustworthiness, which allow
reserve prices to convey signals, could have been a further confounding factor in
previous studies. We will study both effects of reserve prices—the one deriving from
a reference point in valuations and the one deriving from the mechanics of the
auction—in a data set where there is no asymmetric information and thus no scope for
signaling.
3. Auctions for football players at Hattrick
Hattrick is an open-ended football manager game played on the internet by
roughly a million participants.4 Each participant owns a team that plays in one of
many divisions in his country of residence. The goal is to promote to higher divisions
and win the national championship and cup. Successful managers can become
manager of the national team and play in the world cup against other national teams.
A Hattrick season lasts 16 weeks in the real world. Although participation is free and
there is no real money involved in the game itself, there are numerous costly add-on
computer programs that can be purchased to assist the participants in the management
of their teams. In addition, participants can become supporters of the online game by
paying a yearly fee of €25. Becoming a Hattrick Supporter does not affect the game
4 In this section only the features of Hattrick that are most relevant to our auction data are discussed.
The complete game rules and more information about the Hattrick universe can be found at
www.hattrick.org.
6but gives participants the possibility to design the website of the team according to
their own preferences, as well as access to additional statistics and bookmarks.
Managers face a constrained budget in terms virtual money. Given this
constraint, they have to make decisions about training and match orders, tactics and
team psychology, the development of the club and the stadium, recruiting of youth
players, and transfers. Virtual football players have a set of different skills which
define their strength on a certain position within the team. The different skills are
measured on numerical scales, and improving the players’ skills by one increment
takes several weeks of training. Each week only one specific skill can be trained. This
training institution makes the transfer market a crucial aspect of the Hattrick universe:
it is impossible to simultaneously develop skills for players on different positions.
Managers therefore specialize on the training of one particular skill, say scoring, and
thereby produce a constant stream of good forwards. These forwards are then sold on
the transfer market. The proceeds from the sales are used to buy players for other
positions, or to improve the club’s stadium, etc. Revenues from player sales form the
main source of virtual income for the club, together with income from sponsors and
tickets sold for home games.
Each team manager has private information about all skills of his player. Once
a player is posted on the transfer market, however, his skills become public
information. Hence, there is no asymmetric information between buyers and sellers
about players on the market. Of course, the value of a player for a potential buyer
(private value) depends on his fit with this manager’s team, the training and game
strategy, as well as the team’s position in the league. Consider for example the case of
a manager who competes with another team for promotion in her league. Because
promoting teams receive prize money and additional supporters, this manager might
be willing to pay more for a player compared to a manager who is not currently
involved in a promotion contest. Buying the player increases the chance of promotion
and to quickly recover some of the cost, and therefore increases the acquiring
manager’s willingness-to-pay for the player.
Note that managers can rely on various computer programs, which can be
purchased for real money, to assess the value of a player for the team. This
assessment is noisy, however, because even with public knowledge of all player skills
is it impossible to perfectly predict the consequences of a transfer. The manager’s
uncertainty about her private value from a player leads to a potential role for reserve
7prices to influence manager’s willingness-to-pay through reference point effects. The
Hattrick environment resembles real world markets for football players in this respect,
where the sportive and therewith financial consequences from transfers are equally
difficult to predict. The online platform therefore provides a controlled testing ground
for behavioral theories of reserve price effects that potentially influence pricing in real
transfer markets affected by value uncertainty.
The Hattrick transfer market is organized as a standard English auction with
ascending open bids. Players are posted on the market and stay there for three days.5
A non-negative public reserve price can be declared for the player. Potential buyers
can submit bids that are at least as high as the reserve price and higher than the
current highest bid. The reserve price and the current highest bid with information
about the bidder are shown next to the player information (see the screenshot in the
Appendix). If bids are submitted in the last 3 minutes before the deadline, the deadline
is extended by 3 minutes. The highest bidder wins the auction. The transfer price
equals the second highest bid (increased by one bidding increment), or, if there was
only one bid, the reserve price. If no bidder submits a bid which is at least equal to the
reserve price, the player is removed from the transfer list after three days. All transfers
of money and players are automatized. Hence, in contrast to, e.g., eBay, there is no
scope for concerns about the trustworthiness of a seller to affect the transfer.
Participation in transfer auctions is a regular task for Hattrick team managers
and they have a lot of experience in the market. We drew a random sample of hundred
managers from the population of all managers and found an average number of 96
trades on either side of the market. That is, most managers have experience both as a
seller and as a buyer.
4. Empirical strategy and data
Our sample consists of 364 players that were posted on the Hattrick transfer
market. All players are “playmakers” with the strength classification “excellent” for
playmaking, but variation on all other skill dimensions. These players have a score 8
on the numerical skill scale (ranging from 0 to 20), and are good enough to always
provide positive market value. That is, they are tradable. At the same time, this class
5 Putting a player on the transfer list involves a small fee that is negligible compared to the usual
transfer prices for players.
8of players is also affordable to a large group of buyers. We observe all background
and skill variables of the players, variables for the transaction (e.g. the day of the
transaction) and the interaction between seller and player (e.g. tenure in the team), the
reserve prices, and selling prices if the player was traded (see the Appendix for a list
of all variables and explanations). For managers we observe their market experience
(number of trades) and their Hattrick Supporter status.
The sellers in our sample have completed on average 149 trades and the
buyers have completed 131 trades, considerably more than the average manager in the
population. This is due to the fact, that we focus on a market segment (excellent
playmakers), which is hardly accessible for inexperienced managers at the start of
their career.
In our sample, sellers demand a positive reserve price for 313 players. Of
these, 137 players (44%) were not sold and 41 (13%) were sold exactly at the reserve
price (Table 1).
Table 1: Structure of the sample
All players 364
Positive reserve price 313
Sold for more than reserve price 135
Selling price = reserve price 41
Not sold 137
Zero reserve price (all sold at positive price) 51
Our estimates of the effect of the reserve price on the transfer price are based
on the following model:
+ +transfer price reserve price   X . (1)
The vector X contains all player characteristics and attributes of the auction (e.g. the
day of the transfer), and  depicts the residual. The parameter of interest is  , which
measures the extent to which a higher reserve price results in a higher transfer price,
controlling for the quality of a player. Two possible channels contributing to a
positive coefficient  —a psychological reference point effect and a mechanical
effect from the auction design—are illustrated in Figure 1.
On the horizontal lines we measure the bidders’ valuation for a given player.
H and S denote the valuation of the highest and the second highest bidder,
9respectively. The dotted vertical line represents the reserve price. In Figure 1a the
reserve price is relatively low. There is competition between bidders and the selling
price is S.6 Figure 1b depicts the valuations for the same player, but at a reserve price
that is  units higher than the one in Figure 1a. Given that the reserve price serves as a
reference point and that it has a positive effect on valuations, S and H should be
higher in Figure 1b than in Figure 1a. For simplicity we assume in Figure 1 that S and
H increase by the same amount. In the example, the increase in the reserve price by 
raises the transfer price by  .
Note: Dotted vertical line: reserve price; S: second highest bidder’s valuation; H: highest bidder’s
valuation
Figure 1: Reserve price as reference point
Now consider situation 1c. The reserve price is increased by another , and it
now falls between the highest and the second highest bidder’s valuation. Again, there
is the effect of reference dependence which raises valuations S and H by  . However,
the selling price increases by more than  in Figure 1b, because the highest bidder
now pays the reserve price instead of S. Thus, there is a mechanical effect of the
reserve price that simply follows from the auction design and not from reference
6 Recall that the transfer price in this auction will be an increment above the second highest bid.
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dependence. In the example, the effect triggers an additional increase of the transfer
price by  .
To control for the mechanical effect in our estimation we include an additional
slope parameter for those players for which there is only one bidder. Let the indicator
I( )one equal one if there was exactly one bidder and zero otherwise. We then
estimate the equation
+ + I( ) +transfer price reserve price one reserve price    X . (2)
In Eq. (2), the parameter   measures the effect of reference dependence and the
parameter  captures the mechanical effect. For auctions with only one bid, the total
effect of the reserve on the transfer price is given by    . For auctions with more
than one bid there is no mechanical effect, and the total effect equals   .
The estimation of Eqs. (1) and (2) is complicated by censoring, because we do
not observe the dependent variable, the transfer price, for all auctions, but only for
those where the player was actually sold. The problem is illustrated in Figure 1d. The
reserve price in this example is higher than the highest bidder’s valuation. The
observation does not preclude an effect of reference dependence: valuations are
higher in Figure 1d than in Figure 1c, but not high enough to lead to a sale of the
player at the higher reserve price.
There are situations, however, where censoring provides information against
reference dependence. Such a situation is shown in Figure 1e. Assume that Figures 1a,
1b, and 1e depict valuations for three players that are identical in all attributes but
differ with respect to their reserve price. Neglecting the unsold player 1e leaves us
with strong evidence for reference dependence. The higher reserve price for player 1b
relative to 1a seems to have a positive effect on the selling price. If we take the
censored observation 1e into account, however, the evidence becomes much less
convincing. Despite a higher reserve price for player 1e than for 1b, the true
unobserved market value must be smaller than the selling price of the player in 1b.
Hence, this observation provides evidence against reference dependence.
Because the exclusion of censored observations could result in biased
estimates of  and   , we have to control for censoring in the regression analyses.
Note that each player had an individual reserve price and therefore a different
censoring point. We therefore use censored normal regressions, an extension of the
11
Tobit model that allows for variable censoring points, to correct for censoring bias
(Wooldridge, 2002).
The censoring problem and the mechanical effect potentially affect the results
in all studies where reserve prices are set competitively. For all non-experimental
studies, a further problem arises from the potential endogeneity of the reserve price. If
the reserve prices that are set by the sellers reflect some quality of the player or the
market that is observed by buyers and sellers but not by the researcher, any estimation
of the reserve price effect would be biased. Neglecting unobserved factors that
increase both reserve prices and willingness-to-pay inflates the coefficient for the
reserve price.
Although we observe all player skills in our data, this problem can
nevertheless occur. A potentially omitted variable is the name of the Hattrick player
on the market. While the names are easily observable, it is difficult to control for the
quality of these names in our analysis. If, for instance, a virtual player has a name that
is similar to that of a popular real world football player, the seller might ask a higher
price and buyers might be willing to pay more. Another source that can lead to
endogeneity stems from unobserved demand constellations in the market. Certain
player types with specific combinations of attributes may be perceived as particular
valuable both by sellers and buyers If these combinations are not covered by our
model (e.g. if there are complex interactions of player characteristics), the effect is
taken up by the reserve price and we face a clear endogeneity problem.
To test and correct for endogeneity of the reserve price in our censored
regression model we use the Smith and Blundell (1986) two-step procedure. The first
step consists of a linear regression of the reserve price on all player attributes and
instruments. In the second step the residuals of the first step OLS are included in the
censored regression model. This procedure gives consistent estimates of all
parameters of interest even in the presence of endogeneity of the reserve price. The t-
statistic on the first-step residuals in the second step regression provides a test of the
endogeneity.
As instruments we use three variables that are likely to affect the reserve price.
These variables are (1) a dummy variable indicating whether the player comes from
the seller’s own youth team, (2) the number of years the player has been in the seller’s
team, and (3) the improvement of player (in terms of total skill) during his tenure on
the team. None of these variables is easily observed by the buyers, and while they
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should not affect the buyers’ valuations, it is likely that the seller’s valuation is
influenced by his knowledge about the player’s history in his team.
5. Results
All regressions in this section include our full set of player, transaction, and
manager attributes as controls. We report the effects of the reserve price and four key
player attributes to study the effect of possible misspecification in our study.7 The
player attributes that we report are the total skill index of the player, his age, his
general form, and his weekly wage. These player attributes have clear expected
effects on selling prices that are based on the economics of the Hattrick game rules. A
higher score on the total skill index and the form have a positive influence on the
player’s strength and therefore make him more valuable. Increasing age reduces the
speed at which the player’s skills improve with training, thereby reducing his value to
the owner (Englmaier & Schmöller, 2008). Wages constitute the main costs for a team
and therefore have ceteris paribus a negative effect on valuations.
We also report the effect of the managers’ experience (number of trades) and
the Hattrick Supporter status (measured by a dummy) for sellers. Note that the
equivalent attributes for the buying manager can only be observed for those players
that have been sold and therefore cannot be included in the Tobit regressions (see
discussion in section 5.2.).
5.1. Reserve price effects
Ordinary least squares. Column I in Table 2 shows the results from an OLS
regression of Eq. (1), based on those players for which we observe a transfer. This
regression does not control for censoring or endogeneity of the reserve price, and it
does not differentiate between the reference point and the mechanical effect of reserve
prices. The estimation outcome shows a highly significant positive effect of the
reserve price. The point estimate suggests that, holding constant all player
characteristics, a €1 increase in the reserve price increases the transfer price by 68
cents. Counter intuitively, we find a weakly significant negative effect (p=0.053, one-
7 The effect of player attributes is of no interest in itself. In contrast to studies using various products on
eBay, however, player attributes are numerically defined and observable, and have unambiguous
directions. They can therefore inform us about possible biases in the regression analyses.
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sided) of total skill on transfer prices, and a positive effect of wage costs on transfer
price. There is no effect of the player’s form on prices.
Table 2: Regression analyses — Determinants of the transfer price
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Dependent variable:
Transfer price
OLS Censored
normal
regression
Censored
normal
regression
Censored
normal
regression,
accounting for
endogeneity
Reserve price 0.6808**
(0.1136)
0.4856**
(0.0401)
0.255**
(0.0554)
0.0878
(0.1020)
Reserve price  one
bidder only
0.3870**
(0.0575)
0.3578**
(0.05507)
Residuals from first
stage regression
0.3893**
(0.0959)
Total skill index 7.4456
(4.5657)
6.8032**
(2.1071)
1.8972
(2.1479)
11.2482**
(3.1280)
Age 9341.388**
(3489.853)
12070.06**
(2665.863)
12875.95**
(2594.941)
15194.06**
(2563.816)
Form 4437.348
(3729.368)
9877.188**
(3695.059)
10167.92**
(3606.466)
11797.52**
(3491.202)
Wage 45.846**
(13.4961)
12.4345**
(3.8427)
1.6741
(3.9943)
17.13**
(5.6747)
Supporter 6875.018
(11750.06)
987.5283
(11445.36)
2788.367
(11200.37)
–6674.504
(11010.07)
Trades (experience) 119.5612*
(60.2211)
9.6357
(36.3782)
50.051
(35.3785)
79.5979*
(33.9944)
# of observations 227 364 364 364
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust for heteroscedasticity for OLS); *significant at the 5% level,
**significant at the 1% level. All player and transaction characteristics included as controls (only four reported).
Censored normal regression. The second column in Table 2 shows the results of a
censored normal regression of the transfer price on the reserve price. The estimation is
based on the full sample and controls for the censoring effect (i.e. for players that
were not sold). The potential endogeneity of the reserve price is not considered. Again,
the results indicate a positive and significant effect of the reserve price.8 As compared
to the OLS estimation, however, the coefficient shrinks by more than 25 percent. Note
8 The parameter estimates can be interpreted as population parameters, i.e. as effects for both censored
and uncensored observations.
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also that the effects of total skill, age, form and wage point into the expected direction
and are all significant.
In column III we include the interaction between the reserve price and the
observation of a single bidder for the player as shown in Eq. (2). The interaction term
measures the mechanical effect of reserve price setting in the second price auction,
while the direct reserve price effect can be interpreted as a reference point effect. The
estimation suggests that both effects are relevant. The reference point effect
associated with a €1 increase in the reserve price leads to a 26 cent increase in the
transfer price. For cases where there is only bidder, the mechanical effect leads to an
additional 39 cents increase in the transfer price for these players. We cannot reject
the hypothesis that the two effects are equally sized (p=0.21). The coefficients on the
player attributes point in the expected direction, but the effect of the wage and the
total skill are not significant.
Endogeneity of the reserve price. The regression in column IV considers the potential
endogeneity of the reserve price. To obtain consistent estimates of the reserve price
effect we apply the Smith-Blundell two-step procedure for endogeneity in censored
regressions. In the first step we estimate a linear regression of the reserve price on all
player characteristics and the three instruments: the tenure of the player in the seller’s
team, his improvement during his tenure, and whether he comes from the own youth
of the seller. An F-test reveals a high partial correlation of our instruments with the
reserve price (F(3,327)= 4.88, p=0.003). In the second step we calculate the residuals
of the first step reduced-form OLS and include them in the censored regression of Eq.
(2).
The results in column IV show a significant effect of the first-stage residuals,
suggesting that the reserve price is indeed endogenous. Accounting for the
endogeneity turns out to be crucial: the consistent estimate of the uninteracted reserve
price now becomes insignificant. In contrast, our point estimate for the mechanical
effect is virtually the same as the one in column III. The four key player
characteristics have the expected effect and are highly significant.
The key finding of this last regression is that the reference point effect
associated with the reserve price vanishes, once we control for endogeneity. The
impact of the reserve on the transfer price is limited to those cases where there is only
one bidder. In these situations, only the mechanical effect results in higher transfer
15
prices. Replications of the results with alternative specifications show that the pattern
of the reserve price effects from columns I to IV is robust. Using a different set of
instruments 9 or a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable does not
change the results.
5.2. Manager behavior
We included seller’s experience and Hattrick Supporter membership into the
reserve price regressions. One might conjecture that more experienced sellers are
more successful selling their players at high price in a way that is not taken up in the
control variables. They may, for instance, choose better timing within a trading day to
post their players. Hattrick Supporters may be more active participants, who are better
informed about the details of the game. They might therefore be also able to extract
better prices, too.
Our results suggest that experienced traders indeed succeed to sell players at
higher prices. Quantitatively, however, the effect is rather small: One more trading-
experience is associated with a 0.5% increase relative to the average transfer price.
The finding in the basic regression is stable if we control for censoring and
endogeneity in model IV. In contrast, the Hattrick Supporter status has no effect on
transfer prices.
Buyer experience can only be included in the basic OLS because it is only
observed for players that are sold. We did not include the variable in the above OLS
regression to keep the set of explanatory variables constant across specifications.
Running a separate OLS model including the variable, we find no significant effect of
buyer experience (p>0.5). That is, while experienced sellers can extract slightly higher
prices in our sample, experienced buyers seem to be unable to buy at cheaper prices.
As we have discussed in the context of endogeneity, the effect of reserve
prices on transfer prices might be affected by the way the reserve prices are set. It is
therefore useful to study how the selling managers set their reserve prices for players,
and whether manager attributes have an effect on reserve price setting. The question
can be answered through the first step regression of model IV, which estimates the
determinants of the asking price. We find no effects of managers’ experience on how
9 If we use only subsets of the three instruments the first-stage partial F-statistic varies between 4.54
and 7.27 and our point estimates and standard errors in the main equation remain unchanged.
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they set reserve prices. The main determinants of the asking price, accounting
together for more than 40% of the variation in asking prices, are the total skill of the
player, the total skill improvement during the tenure on the seller’s team, and the
player’s current wage. Consistent with economic intuition, total skill increases the
reserve price and higher wage cost decrease the reserve price.
Interestingly, the improvement in total skill during tenure reduces the reserve
price, controlling for the absolute level of total skill. For instance, a player with a total
skill of 1000 who improved by 500 skill units during his tenure in the seller’s team
will be posted with a lower reserve price than a player with a total skill of 1000 who
improved only by 100 units. As discussed in more detail in section 3, managers
usually specialize on the training of one skill and sell those players which they train
intensively to buy players for other positions. Players that receive training strongly
improve their total skill index while others do not. A strong increase in total skill
during tenure on a team therefore means that the player has explicitly been trained for
selling him at the market. The observed effect indicates that such players ‘for-the-
market’ are posted at lower reserve prices.
This observation is consistent with findings in the literature on loss aversion
and reluctance to sell (“endowment effect”). For instance, in the housing market
Genesove and Mayer (2001) show that houses held for resale by professional brokers
are put on the market at lower reserve prices than houses held by occupant owners.
Simonson and Drolet (2004) similarly show that people who have already decided to
sell an item consider the market price as the relevant value, while those who are still
uncertain whether they want to sell would rather consider their own personal needs
and values. This effect can be interpreted in terms of the difference between players
solely held for resale and those held for strategic reasons as part of the team: if market
value is relevant for the former players the managers would rather let the auction
determine the price; and if personal evaluations are relevant for the latter players the
mangers would set a reserve price reflecting their evaluation. This is exactly what we
observe.
6. Discussion
The impact of reserve prices on transfer prices has been an active research
topic in both psychology and economics. While economists have focused on the
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effects of the auction mechanism (Riley & Samuelson, 1981), psychologist are
interested in the effects of reserve prices in the construction of valuations (Kristensen
& Gärling, 1997). We introduce an empirical model incorporating both a mechanical
effect driven by the auction design and a psychological reference point effect. We test
for both effects in a data set where there is symmetric information about ‘product’
attributes and thus no scope for quality signaling via reserve prices.
In the basic linear model that has been used in the literature, i.e. without
distinguishing mechanical and psychological effects, we replicate the strong reserve
price effect and find a similar effect size as earlier studies. When we distinguish
between the mechanical and the psychological effect, we find evidence for both
effects, even when we control for censoring. This suggests that the large impact of
reserve prices reported in the literature could, at least partly, be due to mechanical
effects of the second price auctions. Finally, when we account for the potential
endogeneity of reserve prices, only the mechanical effect survives. Hence, we do not
find evidence on reserve prices serving as reference points affecting bidder’s
uncertain private valuations. This finding could be explained by the absence of
signaling motives in our context. In the presence of asymmetric information, signaling
might thus be an important factor that contributes to a positive reserve price effect.
Comparing our study with other contributions in the literature shows
additional factors that can explain the absence of reference point effects of the reserve
price, and that hint at the importance of the auction institution in the interpretation of
results from market studies. Hattrick auctions differ in two important respects from
the second price auctions that were so far considered in the literature. First, Hattrick
auctions are ascending open bid auctions while eBay uses a proxy auction where
bidders specify a maximum willingness-to-pay. Hattrick therefore requires presence
during the final stage of the auction while at eBay bids can be submitted beforehand,
especially during a phase where no other bids have yet been submitted. This might
amplify the effect of reserve prices. Second, in Hattrick the auction has a soft ending
where the deadline is extended as long as there is active bidding; in eBay there is a
hard deadline. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) and Ariely, Ockenfels and Roth (2005)
have shown that such design features can interact with behavioral bidding strategies
and can therefore lead to very different auction outcomes. In particular, a soft ending
may lead to more competitive behavior during the final phase of the auction, making
other persons’ bids relatively more important compared to the reserve price.
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A further important feature, that is considered in the theoretical work in
Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) and supported by the findings in Ariely and
Simonson (2003), is the availability of independent economic evaluations (past
market prices or list prices for new items) which can influence the strength of
behavioral effects. The market participants in our Hattrick sample are very
experienced with more than hundred trades on average on both sides of the market. In
addition, they can apply various tools to evaluate the value of players for their team.
This setting might reduce the influence of the reserve price as a reference point
compared to casual buyers of consumer goods on eBay. More research comparing
different auction mechanisms and degrees of value uncertainty seems therefore
warranted to develop a taxonomy of market designs that foster or mitigate behavioral
reserve price effects, respectively, and to better inform market designers and traders.
After having identified institutional aspects of auctions that can affect the
relevance of behavioral factors and relating these to our findings, we will now
consider the environment in which the Hattrick auctions are embedded. Hattrick
auctions take place within a manager game with a virtual economy that works with
virtual money. Although some participants spend real money to improve their
performance in the game (by buying add-on programs which, e.g., support the
evaluation of players), no real monetary incentives are involved.
In contrast to Psychologists, Economists have traditionally been skeptical in
interpreting findings based on hypothetical incentives (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; but
see Read (2005) and Camerer & Hogarth (1999) for deviating views). In particular,
deviations from rationality are believed to be more likely in the absence of real
monetary incentives (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). One might argue therefore that our
setting provides an environment in which deviations from rationality, i.e. reference
point effects on bids, would be expected to be even stronger than in real world
auctions. Nevertheless, in our baseline model we find basically identical effects as
studies that rely on the real incentives in eBay auctions. When we control for the
impact of the auction design (the mechanical effect) and econometric problems, we
find weaker evidence for behavioral biases.
Despite the missing monetary real incentives, we argue that Hattrick auctions
are incentive compatible. Apart from the real monetary costs for additional programs,
participation in Hattrick is – like for many other online games – quite costly in the
sense of time invested. The economic constraints within the game structure lead to
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bankruptcy and thus elimination from the game. Receiving a new account to start
from scratch can take several months. Castronova (2008) has studied whether
economic constraints work in virtual environments with virtual money as they do in
the real world. Experimentally comparing the effect of price differences between two
identical virtual markets the author establishes basic laws of demand and price for the
virtual economy. Castronova concludes that online games which are more complex
than most laboratory settings but nevertheless allow for sufficient control can serve
as platforms for economic and psychological research, including the possibility for
experiments (see e.g. Nicklisch and Salz (2008), for a recent online field experiment).
7. Conclusion
Markets for football players represent highly organized institutions in which
employees, i.e. players, are actually traded. In contrast to many product markets there
are experts on both sides of the market and performance is easily observable and
measured extensively through statistics. These features, which are mirrored in the
Hattrick environment studied in this paper, are likely to reduce behavioral effects
from reserve prices—in particular, if one considers the significant financial incentives
at stake in modern professional football.
However, even with transparent performance measures as in the Hattrick game,
uncertainty regarding the value of a player for the team and its future success remain.
Consider, for instance, the possible acquisition of Frank Ribery by Barcelona C.F. -
how would Ribery interact with Lionell Messi? What are the financial consequences?
Negative outcomes in the real world, either financially or in terms of team success,
are highly observable and are scrutinized by the media, supporters, and sponsors
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). The combination of these latter factors suggests that
behavioral effects in the setting of reserve prices and in their effect on transfer prices
might still be relevant.
In the auctions of virtual players at the online platform Hattrick, we did not
find evidence on a reference point effect from reserve prices. In contrast to the
existing literature, we have estimated a model that separates psychological and
mechanical effects of reserve prices on transfer prices. Controlling for censoring, we
found evidence on both effects. Once we accounted for the likely endogeneity of
reserve prices, however, the mechanical effect of the second price auction was
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observed, but no reference point effect. We have discussed several institutional
aspects of auctions that may amplify or reduce reserve price effects. Real football
players’ markets are usually less structured than the auctions considered in the
literature. To make more precise predictions concerning the economic and the
reference point effects in real markets it would be useful to study the effects in more
flexible market institutions. Kristensen and Gärling (1997) have shown that reserve
price effects can also be observed in bilateral negotiations. Their paradigm could be
extended to the simultaneous negotiations between seller and potential buyers
observed for real world football players.
In our data we have observed that the way reserve prices are set by the selling
managers is relevant for market outcomes. We have presented results that are
informative about the factors that affect reserve price setting for football players. In
particular, (young) players mainly seen as an investment might obtain lower prices
than those well integrated in the core team, holding constant the quality of the player.
The latter condition makes it difficult to identify this effect in the real world and
suggests the study of more controlled environments.
Using more controlled laboratory experiments seems more generally a
promising route in the study of reserve price effects in auctions. The existing
evidence—including the one presented in this paper—derives from field data or field
experiments. Although this evidence might have higher external validity than
controlled laboratory results, it is potentially affected by confounding factors. More
controlled experiments would also allow for a systematic variation of the design
features that have been identified as potential determinants for the strength of
behavioral effects, and for a systematic variation of the degree of valuation
uncertainty. Clearly, more research on the role of reserve prices as reference points in
different auctions formats is needed to improve predictions and to evaluate the
efficiency of different designs.
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Appendix
A.1. Screenshot of a player on the transfer market
A.2. List of variables
Player characteristics
Total skill index, age, form, wage, winger, scoring, goalkeeping, passing, defending,
set pieces, injured, experience, leadership, popularity, popularityleadership (clown),
stamina, career goals, aggressiveness, honesty, dummies for special skills (e.g. head)
Transaction characteristics
Data were collected on six days between July 11, 2007 and July 18, 2007. We include
five day dummies and the previous market price for the player.
Manager characteristics
The seller’s experience (trades) and Hattrick supporter status are included to study
manager dependent effects. Buyer’s experience is studied in one specification.
Player-seller interaction characteristics
Tenure of the player on the team, total skill improvement during tenure, descendant
from own youth team or original player
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